{"id":"CVE-2026-17039","title":"Pki-core: dogtag-pki: redhat-pki: pki-core: ca renewal request processing omits realm authorization check performed by enrollment path","summary":"A flaw was found in pki-core. The certificate authority (CA) renewal request path does not perform the realm-based authorization check that the enrollment path performs, allowing an authenticated user entitled to one realm to cause a cer…","severity":"low","cvss":3.1,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","cvssSource":"cna","cwe":["CWE-863"],"vendor":"Red Hat","product":"redhat-pki","affected":["redhat-pki (all versions)","redhat-pki (all versions)","pki-core (all versions)","dogtag-pki (all versions)","pki-core (all versions)","pki-core (all versions)","pki-core (all versions)","pki-core (all versions)"],"ssvc":{"exploitation":"none","automatable":"no","technicalImpact":"partial","timestamp":"2026-07-25T00:53:34.296639Z"},"published":"2026-07-24","updated":"2026-11-06","sourceUpdated":"2026-11-06T18:05:36.949Z","source":"CVEORG","sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-17039","references":[{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2021-20179"},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-17039"},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2506720","label":"RHBZ#2506720"},{"url":"https://github.com/dogtagpki/pki/blob/master/base/ca/database/ds/acl.ldif"},{"url":"https://github.com/dogtagpki/pki/blob/master/base/ca/src/main/java/com/netscape/cms/servlet/cert/EnrollmentProcessor.java"},{"url":"https://github.com/dogtagpki/pki/blob/master/base/ca/src/main/java/com/netscape/cms/servlet/cert/RenewalProcessor.java"},{"url":"https://github.com/dogtagpki/pki/blob/master/base/ca/src/main/java/org/dogtagpki/server/ca/rest/v2/CertServlet.java"},{"url":"https://github.com/dogtagpki/pki/commit/e2de26769761af04b9c56071bd1a1926903c49b6"}],"tags":["cve.org"],"epss":0.00259,"epssPercentile":0.17679,"ingestedAt":"2026-11-06T19:01:36.642Z","slug":"CVE-2026-17039","body":"## Overview\n\nA flaw was found in pki-core. The certificate authority (CA) renewal request path does not perform the realm-based authorization check that the enrollment path performs, allowing an authenticated user entitled to one realm to cause a certificate belonging to a different realm to be renewed without that realm's authorization.\n\n## Affected\n\n- `redhat-pki (all versions)`\n- `redhat-pki (all versions)`\n- `pki-core (all versions)`\n- `dogtag-pki (all versions)`\n- `pki-core (all versions)`\n- `pki-core (all versions)`\n- `pki-core (all versions)`\n- `pki-core (all versions)`\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDeployments that do not configure a realm-mapped authorization manager (AuthzRealmDefault with a non-default realm-to-authorization-manager mapping) for multi-tenant or delegated sub-CA use are not exposed to this issue. For deployments that do use realm-based authorization, using a renewal profile that additionally restricts renewal requests to the original requester narrows exposure: the shipped caDirUserRenewal.cfg profile configures authz.acl=user_origreq=\"auth_token.uid\", which independently blocks cross-user renewal by comparing the renewing caller's UID against the UID that submitted the original request. This is a partial mitigation only -- it is realm-blind rather than realm-aware, so a UID collision across two independently-administered realms' user directories would still bypass it -- and it does not apply to caManualRenewal.cfg or other shipped renewal profiles that configure no authz.acl, which remain exploitable as described. No complete mitigation is available; apply the update once released.","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":17,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":17.1,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}