{"id":"CVE-2026-61826","title":"Bazarr: Plex OAuth API namespace is entirely unauthenticated, allowing config tampering, integration takeover and server-side request forgery","summary":"Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global …","severity":"critical","cvss":10,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","cvssSource":"cna","cwe":["CWE-352","CWE-862"],"vendor":"morpheus65535","product":"bazarr","affected":["bazarr < 1.5.7-beta.14"],"ssvc":{"exploitation":"none","automatable":"yes","technicalImpact":"total","timestamp":"2026-11-05T02:24:51.591160Z"},"published":"2026-10-30","updated":"2026-11-05","sourceUpdated":"2026-11-05T02:25:08.949Z","source":"CVEORG","sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-61826","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/security/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-hh55-x3r4","label":"https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/security/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-hh55-x3r4"},{"url":"https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/4bd29252feebd0803e84cc3ce1bdd24c3a076ed4","label":"https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/4bd29252feebd0803e84cc3ce1bdd24c3a076ed4"},{"url":"https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/f9a8a9514944be0e7b826e67cde042cebfe9c97e","label":"https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/f9a8a9514944be0e7b826e67cde042cebfe9c97e"},{"url":"https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/tree/v1.5.7-beta.14","label":"https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/tree/v1.5.7-beta.14"}],"tags":["cve.org"],"epss":0.00263,"epssPercentile":0.18278,"ingestedAt":"2026-11-05T21:36:00.685Z","slug":"CVE-2026-61826","body":"## Overview\n\nBazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke `POST /api/plex/oauth/logout` to clear credentials and disable the integration, or `POST /api/plex/apikey` to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. `POST /api/plex/oauth/pin` and `GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check` additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. `PlexPinCheck` skips state validation when `state_param` is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. `POST /api/plex/select-server`, `POST /api/plex/oauth/servers`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/create`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/delete` and `POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey` expose further `write_config()` operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in `X-Plex-Token`, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.\n\n## Affected\n\n- `bazarr < 1.5.7-beta.14`\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"midnight","depthScore":55,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":55,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}