{"id":"MAL-2026-17421","title":"Malicious code in spo365-graph (PyPI)","summary":"Malicious code in spo365-graph (PyPI)","severity":"critical","exploited":true,"vendor":"spo365-graph","product":"spo365-graph","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["spo365-graph"],"published":"2026-10-01","updated":"2026-10-08","sourceUpdated":"2026-10-08T20:30:04.745549763Z","source":"OSV","sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17421","references":[{"url":"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/spo365-graph"},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/SPO365-GRAPH/1.1.2/"}],"tags":["osv","pip","malware"],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-02T07:24:14.775Z","slug":"MAL-2026-17421","body":"## Overview\n\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (091649f7b927b27a5bd7a35b53784433050bf58e0dc11acc95316b650a13f60b)\nSPO365-GRAPH presents itself as a SharePoint Online Graph client, but the shipped library module SPO365_GRAPH/SPO365_GRAPH.py consists entirely of stub methods returning placeholder values; all real logic lives in setup.py and executes at install time. On `pip install`, setup.py decodes a zlib+base64 blob (_SERVICE_CONFIG) into a configuration dict holding an AWS STS endpoint, a hardcoded RoleArn, an RSA public key, upload/webhook URLs, a proxy host, and an embedded Lambda source. It then reads ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL and ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN from the environment, requests a GitHub Actions OIDC JWT with audience sts.amazonaws.com, and calls STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity against the attacker's hardcoded RoleArn to obtain temporary credentials under the attacker's trust policy. Using those credentials it submits a CloudFormation CreateStack request whose TemplateBody embeds an AWS::Lambda::Function with Code.ZipFile sourced from the obfuscated config (_cfg['vs']) and a hardcoded role/function name, polls DescribeStacks for Outputs, then base64-decodes the collected outputs, wraps them with hybrid RSA-OAEP + AES-256-CBC using the embedded public key, and uploads the ciphertext via PUT to _cfg['ru'] with a POST fallback to _cfg['fu'], optionally through a hardcoded HTTP proxy at _cfg['px']. Author metadata is a disposable proton.me address. The naming, stub library, and obfuscation of every operational parameter are a cover story for a CI/CD-targeted OIDC-to-AWS credential abuse and remote-code-execution dropper.\n\n## Source: kam193 (ea8dd7600717964f4ca8f8b1134f867f4bf69f1538243d5c7da752eefed99fe1)\nDuring installation, the package deploys a rogue AWS Lambda function to collect credentials from Secret Manager as well as collect other data. Data are then exfiltrated. The malicious code was introduced in version 1.1.2.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-10-spo365-graph\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n\n\n - exfiltration-cloud-tokens\n\n\n - targetted-attack\n\n\n - exfiltration-credentials\n\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `spo365-graph`\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the advisory for the patched release.","depth":"abyssal","depthScore":70,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":52.3,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":18,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}