CVE-2026-102713High· 8.8▾ TwilightThe TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not against the protocol maximum of 4 …
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 48.4 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization from CISA's ADP record at CVE.org: whether exploitation is observed, whether an attack can be automated, and how much of the system is at stake. The CVSS score shown above comes from the assigning CNA record, not NVD.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Sep 30.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via NVD
0.3%
The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than
four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not
against the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one
missing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.
The handler passes nx_packet_length - 4 straight to FileX:
/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */
status = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr,
server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);
...
fx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file),
packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,
packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4);
nx_packet_length is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the
end of the first packet:
ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5
#0 __interceptor_memcpy
#1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78
0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region
Those bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them
back, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.
The same datagram also wedges the server. nx_packet_copy at :1863 needs
ceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the
attacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never
returns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and
the server thread suspended, and no later client is served.
Reject nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX in the DATA branch before either call,
and use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.
Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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