CVE-2026-102714High· 7.1▾ Twilight`_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length > 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is…
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 39.1 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
Need a working PoC? Pro members can cast a request and our team develops one — it lands right here.
Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization from CISA's ADP record at CVE.org: whether exploitation is observed, whether an attack can be automated, and how much of the system is at stake. The CVSS score shown above comes from the assigning CNA record, not NVD.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Sep 30.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via NVD
0.2%
_nx_icmpv6_validate_options() scans the option area with while (length > 2) (common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns NX_SUCCESS. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes.
Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting nx_icmpv6_option_length << 3 with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls.
Zero length byte. The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — _nx_icmpv6_process_ra (nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528), _nx_icmpv6_process_ns (:251, :329), _nx_icmpv6_process_na (:147, :156) and _nx_icmpv6_process_redirect (:247, :350). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one.
Non-zero length byte on a short residue. The three unsigned counters underflow — 2 - 8 becomes 0xFFFFFFFA — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case.
One-byte residue. The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte.
During a runaway walk, stray bytes parsing as a link-layer address option are copied into the neighbor cache (nx_icmpv6_process_ns.c:280, :293) and subsequently used as the destination MAC for frames to that neighbour, placing off-packet memory on the link. Confirmed by inspection, not reproduced.
Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
CVE-2026-92853High· 8.7Out-of-bounds Read via a Zero-length TLS 1.3 Certificate Message in NetX Secure
CVE-2026-106464High· 8.7`_nx_secure_x509_parse_signature_data` computes the certificate signature's length as `tlv_length - 1` without first checking that `tlv_length` is non-zero
CVE-2026-102726Medium· 6.0Unbounded PPP IPCP Option Parsing Causes a Worker Stall and Out-of-bounds Read
CVE-2026-111075High· 8.7JITServer: Pre-authentication remote crash via integer underflow and out-of-bounds heap read in DataDescriptor deserialization
CVE-2026-92843High· 8.7Out-of-bounds Read via the TLS 1.3 Certificate extensions_length in NetX Secure
CVE-2026-92454Medium· 6.1JPEG decoder: truncated segments are read past the image buffer, and a zero sampling factor hangs the decode