The `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data

Overview

The _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse() function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake.

The function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller's buffer before checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer.

code:

nx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c

UINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type,

                                          USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length,
                                          const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length)


{



UINT   current_index;



USHORT current_tag;



ULONG  length;



ULONG  length_bytes;

    current_index = 0;
    current_tag = buffer[current_index];      /* <-- read before the bounds check */
    if (*buffer_length < 1)
    {
        return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
    }

The remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by length_bytes > 4 || length_bytes > *buffer_length before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against length > *buffer_length, and the second single-byte length read follows its own *buffer_length < 1 guard. The tag read is the only load placed ahead of its check.

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.