CVE-2026-103365Medium· 5.3▾ Sunlit

The Bookly – Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in versions up to, and including, 28.4 via the classic booking form's Details step

▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal

Depth score29/ 100 · Low

impact 29.2 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0

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Proof of concept

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Published

Oct 10, 2026

Updated

Oct 13, 2026

CVSS

5.3

Vendor

ladela

Product

Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly

CWE

CWE-200

Depth score

29 · Low

EPSS

0.28% · p20

Platforms

—

Source

NVD

Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

CISA SSVC

decided 2026-10-11

Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical impact: partial

Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization from CISA's ADP record at CVE.org: whether exploitation is observed, whether an attack can be automated, and how much of the system is at stake.

EPSS history

Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Oct 11.

0.3% → 0.3%

Timeline

Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.

3 events · 3 days

Oct 10, 2026Published
Disclosed via NVD
Oct 11, 2026EPSS first tracked
0.3%
Oct 13, 2026Record revised
Last analysed / modified upstream

ladela CWE-200 #nvd #cve.org

Affected

online_scheduling_and_appointment_booking_system_bookly <= 28.4

Full technical detail▾

Overview

The Bookly – Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in versions up to, and including, 28.4 via the classic booking form's Details step. The endpoint bookly_render_details is registered for both wp_ajax and wp_ajax_nopriv, the module overrides csrfTokenValid() to always return true, and Bookly\Frontend\Components\Booking\InfoText::getCodes() calls UserBookingData::getCustomer() to load the persisted Customer entity keyed solely by the attacker-supplied phone (or email) with no invocation of the plugin's own customerIdentityConfirmed() predicate. When a site owner has placed the supported {client_name}, {client_email}, {client_phone}, or {client_note} placeholders into the Details step's Appearance information text, the matched customer's stored name, email, phone and internal notes are substituted into the returned HTML. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who know only a registered customer's primary phone (or email) to read that customer's stored personal data.

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.

References

Related vulnerabilities

Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.

#nvd#cve.org