CVE-2026-10666High· 8.1▾ MidnightPoC availableparse_ipv4() in subsys/net/ip/utils.c (reached via net_ipaddr_parse() for strings of the form "a.b.c.d:port") copies the port substring into a fixed 17-byte stack buffer (char ipaddr[NET_IPV4_ADDR_LEN + 1]) using a length of str_len - en…
▾ Midnight zone — Critical, or high with PoC / in-the-wild
impact 44.6 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 12
A public proof-of-concept already exists for this vulnerability — see Exploit availability below.
Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization from CISA's ADP record at CVE.org: whether exploitation is observed, whether an attack can be automated, and how much of the system is at stake.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Aug 2.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via NVD
0.5%
0.5% → 0.7%
Exploit / PoC code exists
parse_ipv4() in subsys/net/ip/utils.c (reached via net_ipaddr_parse() for strings of the form "a.b.c.d:port") copies the port substring into a fixed 17-byte stack buffer (char ipaddr[NET_IPV4_ADDR_LEN + 1]) using a length of str_len - end - 1, where str_len is the full, unbounded input length and end is only the (<=15-byte) offset of the ':' delimiter. Because the destination size is never consulted, a crafted address string with a long suffix after the colon (e.g. "1.2.3.4:" followed by hundreds of bytes) causes an out-of-bounds stack write whose length and contents are fully attacker-controlled (memcpy of the suffix plus a trailing NUL), enabling memory corruption and at minimum a denial of service, and potentially control-flow hijack. The parser is reached from the standard socket API (zsock_getaddrinfo / literal-address resolution), DNS server-string configuration, and the eswifi Wi-Fi co-processor DNS-response path, so an application that resolves a network-influenced address string is exposed. The bug was introduced when the parser was added (Zephyr v1.9.0) and shipped in all releases through v4.4.0. The fix removes the unbounded copy and validates the port length before copying into a small dedicated buffer. Note: the equivalent IPv6 "[addr]:port" path in parse_ipv6() retains the same unbounded copy at this commit and remains a separate, still-reachable instance of the defect.
Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Field changes observed since this record was first indexed.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
CVE-2026-15894High· 8.8The Bluetooth Mesh On-Demand Private Proxy solicitation handler in subsys/bluetooth/mesh/solicitation.c copies a received Solicitation PDU into a fixed 17-byte stack buffer without bounding the source length
CVE-2026-10673High· 8.3Out-of-bounds write in ADIN2111/ADIN1110 OA SPI Ethernet RX frame reassembly
CVE-2026-10641High· 7.1Out-of-bounds write in Bluetooth HFP Hands-Free CIND indicator parsing (cind_handle_values)
CVE-2026-10665High· 7.4In Zephyr's WireGuard subsystem (subsys/net/lib/wireguard), wg_process_data_message() in wg_crypto.c linearizes an inbound transport-data payload into a fixed pool buffer of CONFIG_WIREGUARD_BUF_LEN bytes before decryption
CVE-2026-10664Medium· 5.0The nRF70 Wi-Fi driver's power-save event handler nrf_wifi_event_proc_get_power_save_info() in drivers/wifi/nrf_wifi/src/wifi_mgmt.c copied TWT (Target Wake Time) flow entries from an nrf_wifi_umac_event_power_save_info event into the fi…
CVE-2026-82962Medium· 6.5Out-of-bounds write in Zephyr Ethernet L2 when adding the link-layer header to a forwarded packet