---
id: CVE-2026-10843
title: >-
  Cloud-credential-operator: cco mint-mode credentialsrequest manifests grant
  account-wide iam access beyond cluster scope on aws
summary: >-
  A flaw was found in the OpenShift Cloud Credential Operator Mint-mode IAM
  policies for AWS. Operator credentials are provisioned with account-wide scope
  for destructive actions rather than being restricted to cluster-owned
  resources, ena…
severity: high
cvss: 7.2
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'
cvssSource: cna
cwe:
  - CWE-250
vendor: Red Hat
product: openshift4/ose-cloud-credential-operator
affected:
  - openshift4/ose-cloud-credential-operator (all versions)
  - openshift4/ose-cloud-credential-rhel9-operator (all versions)
  - openshift5/ose-cloud-credential-rhel9-operator (all versions)
ssvc:
  exploitation: none
  automatable: 'no'
  technicalImpact: total
  timestamp: '2026-06-04T14:25:05.455444Z'
published: '2026-06-04'
updated: '2026-10-30'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-30T15:41:06.705Z'
source: CVEORG
sourceUrl: 'https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-10843'
references:
  - url: 'https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-10843'
  - url: 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2484738'
    label: RHBZ#2484738
tags:
  - cve.org
epss: 0.00328
epssPercentile: 0.2606
ingestedAt: '2026-11-05T16:07:30.449Z'
---

## Overview

A flaw was found in the OpenShift Cloud Credential Operator Mint-mode IAM policies for AWS. Operator credentials are provisioned with account-wide scope for destructive actions rather than being restricted to cluster-owned resources, enabling cross-scope impact after credential compromise.

## Affected

- `openshift4/ose-cloud-credential-operator (all versions)`
- `openshift4/ose-cloud-credential-rhel9-operator (all versions)`
- `openshift5/ose-cloud-credential-rhel9-operator (all versions)`

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.

### Workarounds

Migrate from CCO Mint mode to STS mode (AWS Security Token Service), which eliminates long-lived IAM users and uses short-lived role-scoped OIDC tokens. Alternatively, switch to CCO Manual mode or Passthrough mode. If mode migration is not immediately feasible, manually restrict the IAM policies on CCO-provisioned IAM users by adding tag-based conditions scoping destructive actions to resources tagged with kubernetes.io/cluster/<infraName>=owned. For S3 actions, restrict Resource to the specific registry bucket ARN rather than "*". Enterprise defense-in-depth: deploy AWS Service Control Policies (SCPs) to deny destructive actions from non-approved principals, and apply IAM Permission Boundaries to CCO-created users.