---
id: CVE-2026-110952
title: >-
  Apache Kafka: Broker does not enforce JWT issuer and audience validation for
  SASL/OAUTHBEARER by default
summary: >-
  A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using the
  bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but two
  further checks are only performed when explicitly configured:


  - The issuer (iss) claim is…
severity: none
cwe:
  - CWE-345
  - CWE-1188
vendor: Apache Software Foundation
product: 'org.apache.kafka:kafka'
affected:
  - 'org.apache.kafka:kafka >= 3.1.0 < 4.4.0'
published: '2026-10-28'
updated: '2026-10-28'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-28T16:37:34.723Z'
source: CVEORG
sourceUrl: 'https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-110952'
references:
  - url: 'https://kafka.apache.org/cve-list'
tags:
  - cve.org
ingestedAt: '2026-10-28T17:14:44.469Z'
---

## Overview

A Kafka broker that authenticates clients with SASL/OAUTHBEARER using the bundled JWKS-backed validator always verifies the JWT signature, but two further checks are only performed when explicitly configured:

- The issuer (iss) claim is verified only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token carrying the expected audience is accepted regardless of which issuer minted it.
- An audience (aud) claim is required only when sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience is set. When it is unset, a validly-signed token that omits the aud claim is accepted. (A token that carries an aud claim is
  still rejected when no expected audience is configured.)

Both options default to unset and have been documented as optional (Importance LOW) since KIP-768 (3.1.0).

Impact:
  The exposure is realizable mainly in deployments whose JWKS endpoint serves signing keys for more than one issuer (a multi-tenant identity provider, an aggregated/shared JWKS, or shared signing keys): a token
  minted for a different issuer, or a token lacking an audience, may be accepted to authenticate — potentially as a higher-privileged principal. In a single-issuer deployment where the provider controls the iss
  claim and issues audience-scoped tokens, exposure is limited. The signature trust anchor remains enforced in all cases. This is distinct from CVE-2026-33557 (acceptance of unsigned/unvalidated tokens); here the
  signature is validated and only the issuer/audience checks are not enforced by default.

Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required):
  Set both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer (to your provider's exact iss value) and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience (to the audience(s) your brokers expect), per listener. Brokers that set these perform
  exact-match issuer/audience checks and are not affected. Both have been available since 3.1.0.

Resolution:
  - From Apache Kafka 4.4.0: a broker configured with a JWKS endpoint fails to start unless both sasl.oauthbearer.expected.issuer and sasl.oauthbearer.expected.audience are set (secure by default). Deployments that
  intentionally do not restrict the issuer and/or audience may opt out per axis with sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.issuer=true and/or sasl.oauthbearer.allow.unverified.audience=true.

## Affected

- `org.apache.kafka:kafka >= 3.1.0 < 4.4.0`

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.