CVE-2026-120632None▾ SunlitCGI versions before 5.00 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via a backtracking regex on the XForms multipart/related Content-Type. When a POST Content-Type contains multipart/related, the boundary and start parameters are extracted with an u…
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 2.8 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via CVEORG
0.2%
CGI versions before 5.00 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via a backtracking regex on the XForms multipart/related Content-Type.
When a POST Content-Type contains multipart/related, the boundary and start parameters are extracted with an unanchored pattern that puts .+ on either side of the boundary capture, which backtracks in cubic time on a header that does not match. No request body is needed.
CGI < 5.00Upgrade to CGI 5.00 or later.
For deployments that cannot upgrade, reject Content-Type request headers longer than 1KB at the web server.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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