CVE-2026-18415Medium· 6.3▾ Sunlitieee802154_send() in subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154.c copies the outgoing packet into a single fixed 125-byte transmit buffer (tx_frame_buf_pool, sized IEEE802154_MTU). In builds with CONFIG_NET_L2_IEEE802154_FRAGMENT enabled (the d…
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 34.7 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization from CISA's ADP record at CVE.org: whether exploitation is observed, whether an attack can be automated, and how much of the system is at stake.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Sep 29.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via NVD
0.10%
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.10% → 0.10%
ieee802154_send() in subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154.c copies the outgoing packet into a single fixed 125-byte transmit buffer (tx_frame_buf_pool, sized IEEE802154_MTU). In builds with CONFIG_NET_L2_IEEE802154_FRAGMENT enabled (the default whenever CONFIG_NET_6LO is set), the branch taken when 6LoWPAN fragmentation is not required performed an unchecked net_buf_add_mem(frame_buf, pkt_buf->data, pkt_buf->len). The only guard was __ASSERT_NO_MSG() inside net_buf_simple_add(), which is compiled out without CONFIG_ASSERT, so an oversized packet silently overran the frame buffer.
The defect is not reachable from the radio: for NET_AF_INET6 packets ieee802154_6lo_encode_pkt() compares the whole packet length against IEEE802154_MTU and takes the fragmentation path when it does not fit, so every buffer copied on the unfragmented branch is within bounds. It is reachable through NET_AF_PACKET sockets bound to an 802.15.4 interface: for NET_SOCK_RAW the 6LoWPAN block is skipped entirely and for NET_SOCK_DGRAM it returns early on the address-family test, leaving no length validation anywhere on the transmit path (net_context_sendto() and net_if_tx() apply none, and pkt_buffer_length() does not clamp the allocation for this L2).
An application — or, in a CONFIG_USERSPACE build, an unprivileged application thread using the zsock_socket()/zsock_sendto() syscalls — can therefore drive a supervisor-mode out-of-bounds write of chosen bytes past the 125-byte pool buffer. With the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE of 128 bytes the overrun is bounded to roughly ll_hdr_len + 3 bytes; with CONFIG_NET_BUF_VARIABLE_DATA_SIZE a single storage buffer can be as large as CONFIG_NET_PKT_BUF_TX_DATA_POOL_SIZE, making the overrun far larger. The consequence is corruption of memory adjacent to the pool, with a crash or further compromise of kernel state as the practical impact.
The fix validates ll_hdr_len + net_pkt_get_len(pkt) + authtag_len against IEEE802154_MTU before any copy and adds a tailroom-checking copy_pkt_to_frame() helper that returns -EMSGSIZE instead of overrunning the buffer. The same change also linearizes the whole net_buf chain into one MAC frame, so packet storage boundaries no longer become frame boundaries on the wire.
Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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