CVE-2026-40575Critical· 9.1▾ MidnightOAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via X-Forwarded-Uri Header Spoofing
▾ Midnight zone — Critical, or high with PoC / in-the-wild
impact 50.1 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Aug 1.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
0.5%
9.1 → 8.7
critical → high
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.5% → 0.7%
8.7 → 9.1
high → critical
A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy.
Deployments are affected when all of the following are true:
--reverse-proxy--skip_auth_routes or the legacy --skip-auth-regexOAuth2 Proxy may trust a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when --reverse-proxy is enabled and --skip-auth-route or --skip-auth-regex is configured. An attacker can spoof this header so OAuth2 Proxy evaluates authentication and skip-auth rules against a different path than the one actually sent to the upstream application.
This can result in an unauthenticated remote attacker bypassing authentication and accessing protected routes without a valid session.
This issue is addressed as part of the newly introduced --trusted-proxy-ip flag in v7.15.2. If you leave it unset, OAuth2 Proxy will continue to trust ALL source IPs (0.0.0.0/0) for backwards compatibility, which means a client may still be able to spoof forwarded headers. Therefore after upgrading we urge you to use the new --trusted-proxy-ip flag to set the IPs or CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies that are allowed to send X-Forwarded-* headers and furthermore implement the mitigation steps outlined below to properly configure your load balancer infrastructure.
Strip any client-provided X-Forwarded-Uri header at the reverse proxy or load balancer level
Explicitly overwrite X-Forwarded-Uri with the actual request URI before forwarding requests to OAuth2 Proxy
Example nginx mitigation for the auth subrequest:
location /internal-auth/ {
internal; # Ensure external users can't access this path
# Make sure the OAuth2 Proxy knows where the original request came from.
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
# set the value to the actual $request_uri and therefore strip any user provided X-Forwarded-Uri
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Uri $request_uri;
proxy_pass http://oauth2-proxy:4180/;
}
Restrict direct client access to OAuth2 Proxy so it can only be reached through a trusted reverse proxy
Remove or narrow --skip-auth-route / --skip-auth-regex rules where possible
github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 >= 7.5.0, < 7.15.2Upgrade to a patched release:
github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 7.15.2Field changes observed since this record was first indexed.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
CVE-2026-76835Critical· 9.1OAuth2 Proxy honours a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when deciding whether a request may skip authentication, because the guard added for CVE-2026-40575 is inert in the default reverse-proxy configuration
CVE-2025-54576High· 7.4github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy: OAuth2-Proxy authentication bypass (CVE-2025-54576)
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CVE-2021-21411Medium· 5.5OAuth2-Proxy's `--gitlab-group` GitLab Group Authorization config flag stopped working in v7.0.0
CVE-2021-21291Medium· 5.4Subdomain checking of whitelisted domains could allow unintended redirects in oauth2-proxy
CVE-2026-72815Medium· 6.9go-chi chi versions >= 5.2.1 and before 5.3.0 contain an IP spoofing vulnerability in the RealIP middleware, which blindly trusts the first (leftmost) value of the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header