PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding

Overview

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.

Affected

• PraisonAI >= 4.5.126, < 4.6.59

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.

Package advisory (CVE-2026-57114)

Affected packages:

• praisonai >= 4.5.126, < 4.6.59

Patched in:

• praisonai 4.6.59

Source: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v