CVE-2026-59896Medium· 6.5▾ Sunlithono/jsx does not isolate context per request, leading to cross-request data disclosure
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 35.8 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 31.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via GHSA
0.2%
0.2% → 0.3%
hono/jsx did not isolate context values per request during server-side rendering. While an async component was suspended on await, its provided context value stayed observable to other requests rendering concurrently, so useContext() could return a value from a different in-flight request.
During server-side rendering, context values were kept in a process-wide structure rather than scoped to each request's render. While an async component awaited, another request entering the same provider could observe or replace the value; when the first render resumed, it could read the other request's context.
This affects the usual ways request-scoped data is passed through a server-rendered JSX tree:
createContext() / useContext()jsxRenderer middleware and useRequestContext()It arises only when context is read after an await inside an async component while requests render concurrently. Reading context synchronously (before any await), purely synchronous rendering, and client-side (DOM) rendering are not affected.
Under concurrent requests, a response could be rendered with another request's context. A user may receive HTML rendered for a different user, and an authorization check performed after an await may be evaluated against another user's data.
This may lead to:
hono >= 4.11.8, < 4.12.27Upgrade to a patched release:
hono 4.12.27Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
CVE-2026-59897Medium· 4.8Hono: API Gateway v1 adapter can drop a distinct repeated request header value during de-duplication
CVE-2026-59895Medium· 6.1Hono: Server-Side XSS via JSX Escaping Bypass in cx() Utility
GHSA-3wcj-gjvf-fvchMedium· 4.8Duplicate Advisory: Hono vulnerable to Prototype Pollution possible through __proto__ key allowed in parseBody({ dot: true })
GHSA-cw3j-28qq-x3xhMedium· 6.5Duplicate Advisory: Hono vulnerable to Vary Header Injection leading to potential CORS Bypass
CVE-2025-71381Medium· 6.5Hono before 4.10.2 (fixed in 4.10.3) contains a flaw in its CORS middleware: when the origin is not set to "*", the middleware copies the Vary header from the incoming request into the response
GHSA-6623-4q32-82v8Low· 4.7Duplicate Advisory: hono/jsx renders plain strings unescaped in boundary components, leading to XSS