CVE-2026-80731High· 7.8▾ TwilightIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: remove CAP_SYS_RAWIO zero-padding in dev_validate_header dev_validate_header() reads dev->hard_header_len directly when zero-padding short link layer headers for …
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 42.9 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization from CISA's ADP record at CVE.org: whether exploitation is observed, whether an attack can be automated, and how much of the system is at stake.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Oct 16.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via NVD
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.1%
7.8 → 4.7
high → medium
4.7 → 7.8
medium → high
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: remove CAP_SYS_RAWIO zero-padding in dev_validate_header
dev_validate_header() reads dev->hard_header_len directly when zero-padding short link layer headers for CAP_SYS_RAWIO holders:
if (capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {
memset(ll_header + len, 0, dev->hard_header_len - len);
return true;
}
Packet send paths call dev_validate_header() on skbs whose headroom was allocated from an earlier hard_header_len read. If the device is reconfigured so that dev->hard_header_len increases before validation, the memset writes past the reserved buffer, an out-of-bounds write.
This out-of-bounds write is masked in some SOCK_RAW paths today because the same concurrent increase can first make skb_push() exceed the reserved headroom and trigger skb_under_panic(). Remove the zero-padding branch before making those hard_header_len reads consistent, so the snapshot fixes do not turn a loud panic into a silent overwrite.
This path is only reached for variable length L2 protocols, where len < hard_header_len but len >= min_header_len. No remaining in-tree variable length L2 protocol implements header_ops->validate, and the CAP_SYS_RAWIO bypass that zero-pads and accepts short headers has no real value beyond allowing testing of intentionally malformed input.
Drop the CAP_SYS_RAWIO branch. The remaining reads of dev->hard_header_len in dev_validate_header() are comparisons only and have no memory safety impact.
Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Field changes observed since this record was first indexed.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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