CVE-2026-89542Critical· 9.8▾ MidnightIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reads the EC and RRC header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 before validating that the token is a…
▾ Midnight zone — Critical, or high with PoC / in-the-wild
impact 53.9 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization from CISA's ADP record at CVE.org: whether exploitation is observed, whether an attack can be automated, and how much of the system is at stake. The CVSS score shown above comes from the assigning CNA record, not NVD.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Sep 12.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via CVEORG
0.2%
— → 7.7
none → high
— → 7.7
none → high
— → 9.8
none → critical
9.8 → 7.7
critical → high
7.7 → 9.8
high → critical
0.2% → 0.8%
Last analysed / modified upstream
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens
gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reads the EC and RRC header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 before validating that the token is at least GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) bytes long, and its rotate_left() helper passes buf->len - base to xdr_buf_subsegment() without verifying that base <= buf->len. When a caller hands in a sub-16-byte token, or a token whose declared len leaves base past the end of the buffer, three distinct failures follow:
gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(offset, len, buf)
ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset
ec = *(ptr + 4) /* OOB read on short head */
rrc = *(ptr + 6) /* OOB read on short head */
rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc)
xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf,
base, buf->len - base) /* u32 wrap when base > len */
_rotate_left(&subbuf, shift)
shift %= buf->len /* divide-by-zero when base == len */
After decryption, the cleanup arithmetic has the same shape:
movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len);
movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen >
buf->head[0].iov_len);
The BUG_ON re-adds the value just subtracted, so it reduces to min(A, B) > A and is permanently false; it cannot catch the unsigned underflow of movelen, which then drives a ~UINT_MAX-byte memmove().
Add four defense-in-depth guards inside the unwrap core so it is safe regardless of what its callers validate:
Linux >= de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26 < 299d281c7225ded15b28cb861a98d818d82787fcLinux >= de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26 < 84ddbc8d084c0251d534f14f5d1a7da05be56404Linux >= de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26 < 075d7cfc4df8c54cb202ba8b28420370c03ba9b6Linux >= de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26 < f2591660e0eb263c9415bf0d0bb1b111e62df7a4Linux >= de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26 < dddcb0f4b7e27fac16a78ea9a1c8ec2e8a241087Linux >= de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26 < 806584a4b67a7233870c33e5b8f872e76dd02988Linux >= de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26 < a7894e10572d53eb10109b8d07459cc8d3435811Linux >= de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26 < 6959297aaa9572783d620a226d73c3fb94494888Linux 2.6.35Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Field changes observed since this record was first indexed.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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