In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the synchronous fallback

Overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning

ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the synchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers clone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone() currently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no storage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT write past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report a slab OOB write.

Allocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size, copy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the existing fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize because an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization.

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.