In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR's PD rxe_rereg_user_mr() reassigns mr->ibmr.pd first and only then validates the IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS argument: …

Overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR's PD

rxe_rereg_user_mr() reassigns mr->ibmr.pd first and only then validates the IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS argument:

if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD) {
	rxe_put(old_pd);
	rxe_get(pd);
	mr->ibmr.pd = ibpd;
}

if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) {
	if (access & ~RXE_ACCESS_SUPPORTED_MR)
		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
	mr->access = access;
}

Both flags pass the entry check because RXE_MR_REREG_SUPPORTED is IB_MR_REREG_PD | IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS, so a caller can reach the access check with mr->ibmr.pd already reassigned.

mr->ibmr.pd is owned by the core, which adjusts pd->usecnt only on the success path: ib_uverbs_rereg_mr() jumps to put_new_uobj on a driver error without undoing the reassignment, so mr->pd == new_pd while the usecnts still charge the MR to orig_pd. ib_dereg_mr_user() then decrements new_pd, whose count can reach zero while a memory window still references it; uverbs_free_pd() frees the PD on that count alone and rxe_mw_cleanup() writes to freed memory:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881301dd690 by task rxe_poc/591 __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0 rxe_mw_cleanup+0x42/0x200 __rxe_cleanup+0x115/0x370 rxe_dealloc_mw+0x4c/0x80 Allocated by task 591: ib_uverbs_alloc_pd+0x258/0x540 Freed by task 591: ib_dealloc_pd_user+0x174/0x210 uverbs_free_pd+0x8d/0xc0 ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd+0x18e/0x1d0

Validate the access flags before mutating any state so the callback either applies every requested change or none.

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.