CVE-2026-98976High· 7.8▾ TwilightIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the mount that is moved b…
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 42.9 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
Need a working PoC? Pro members can cast a request and our team develops one — it lands right here.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Oct 24.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via CVEORG
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.2%
— → 7.8
none → high
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath
attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint allowing the top mount to be unmounted.
Consider two mount namespaces:
(H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d (Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives propagation from the host's P and its copy of M's cover on P/d is locked Z's owner must not get to see P/d.
Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands beneath (Z)'s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)'s cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked.
Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:
Z: umount2(P/d) = EINVAL /* the cover is locked */
H: mount X on P/d, umount X /* both propagate into Z /*
Z: umount2(P/d) = 0 /* the cover is now unlocked */
Z: read P/d/secret = "covered-by-root" /* secret revealed */
So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the caller has placed. A propagated copy that lands beneath a locked mount is locked as well so that the mount at the bottom of the stack carries a lock the way every check expects. The mount on top of it remains locked to ensure that it keeps covering even if the propagated mount is unmounted again.
Linux >= c62a4766937edec2962d52e583276b459b739f2d < f1f0c24ca701d7d3061c7f69f7450f1734c11745Linux >= c62a4766937edec2962d52e583276b459b739f2d < d74d66aa708ccf2bc0b1e265a83fed0f2308d5c4Linux 7.1Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Field changes observed since this record was first indexed.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
CVE-2026-99100Nonewifi: p54: validate firmware record lengths
CVE-2024-38564High· 7.8bpf: Add BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB attach type enforcement in BPF_LINK_CREATE
CVE-2026-99092Noneriscv: patch: fix handling of bpf-jit execmem addresses
CVE-2026-99089NoneASoC: samsung: i2s: enable op_clk in probe to balance runtime PM
CVE-2026-99093Nonemm: don't schedule deferred kernel page table freeing while booting
CVE-2026-99088Nonenet: openvswitch: validate transport header presence in set_ipv6_addr