dm ioctl: don't let data_start run past the buffer

Overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dm ioctl: don't let data_start run past the buffer

struct dm_ioctl has seven bytes of trailing padding, so the smallest buffer userspace is allowed to ask for, offsetof(struct dm_ioctl, data), is seven bytes shorter than sizeof(struct dm_ioctl).

get_result_buffer() sets data_start to sizeof(struct dm_ioctl) without looking at how big the buffer actually is. Ask for the minimum and data_start ends up seven bytes past the end. Callers add it to data_size, and ctl_ioctl() copies that much back to userspace:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0xad/0xd0 Read of size 312 at addr ffff8880169e4c00 by task repro-dm/140 ctl_ioctl+0x5e3/0xcb0 dm_ctl_ioctl+0x25/0x40 allocated 305-byte region [ffff8880169e4c00, ffff8880169e4d31)

A DM_LIST_DEVICES with data_size set to 305 is enough to hit it, and the seven bytes that leak are whatever sat next to the allocation.

Clamp data_start to the buffer size.

Note that this is not a security bug because the out-of-bounds read can only be triggered by root.

Affected

• Linux >= 76c072b48e39e9291fbf02d6c912cf27d65e093d < 98195e822343a656b92e235847ab3e72b1a3f920
• Linux >= 76c072b48e39e9291fbf02d6c912cf27d65e093d < e5c3f3d8935ecc64c962fb66e6a86dbf79218f61
• Linux >= 76c072b48e39e9291fbf02d6c912cf27d65e093d < 5680b6fb3054677d4ee65d3baba24b649f1b430e
• Linux >= 76c072b48e39e9291fbf02d6c912cf27d65e093d < 725b49c689bbb29ef740b0d6b5ea9390baa9a695
• Linux >= 76c072b48e39e9291fbf02d6c912cf27d65e093d < 9b3fcf519d370df94a56f3b272d9eddffffa5be8
• Linux 2.6.25

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.