GHSA-q84f-53jg-9ppmHigh· 8.1▾ Twilightbetter-auth: Device login approval does not show the requesting client or permissions
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 44.6 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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You may be affected if you use better-auth from 1.3.8-beta.3 up to, but not including, 1.7.0-rc.3, and you enable the deviceAuthorization() plugin. This range includes all 1.6 releases.
You are affected only if all of these are also true:
validateClient is not configured, or the attacker can use a valid public client.You are not affected if you do not enable the opt-in deviceAuthorization() plugin.
The device authorization plugin lets a user sign in on one device by approving a short code on another. In affected versions, the approval information given to the user leaves out which client asked for access and which permissions it wants. The official approval examples therefore show only a generic request and a code, so users cannot tell their own device from an attacker's request.
An attacker who convinces a signed-in user to approve the attacker's code receives a live Better Auth session token for that user. The attacker can then read or change any data the user's account can access. The attack needs the opt-in device flow, a request the attacker creates, and a user who actively approves it; it is not a sign-in bypass without user action.
The fix first shipped in 1.7.0-rc.3. Upgrade to [email protected] or later. No 1.6 release contains the fix.
After upgrading, GET /device returns the requesting client_id and scope to the signed-in account that owns the request. If you built your own approval page, update it to show that client and those permissions, and keep approval disabled until they load.
If you cannot upgrade yet, do the following:
deviceAuthorization(), or block untrusted access to /device/code.validateClient allowlist. Do not rely on the allowlist alone: it limits who can start the flow, but it does not give users the missing approval information.A device starts the flow by calling /device/code. The plugin stores the client identifier and any requested scope with the pending request. Before approval, GET /device returns only the user code and its status. This is true even for a signed-in session of the user account that owns the request. An approval page built from that response cannot show which client asked for access or which permissions it wants. After approval, the original device code can be redeemed at /device/token for a Better Auth session token.
RFC 8628 describes this remote phishing scenario. It recommends that the server tell users they are authorizing a device and ask them to confirm that the device is in their possession. It also recommends showing device information that helps users detect impersonation. Client allowlisting reduces who can start the flow, but it does not give users the missing approval information. A valid public client can therefore still be affected when its identifier and requested permissions are not shown.
better-auth >= 1.3.8-beta.3, < 1.7.0-rc.3Upgrade to a patched release:
better-auth 1.7.0-rc.3Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
CVE-2026-109346High· 8.1better-auth from 1.3.8-beta.3 before 1.7.0-rc.3 contains a UI misrepresentation vulnerability in the deviceAuthorization plugin because GET /device omits the requesting client_id and scope
GHSA-r4xp-prcw-77qfHigh· 7.4better-auth: OAuth Proxy lets an attacker sign in as another user
CVE-2026-114607Critical· 9.1better-auth: OAuth state can be used as a Magic Link to sign in as another user
GHSA-qq9h-g4jm-xgf3High· 8.3Better Auth: Account takeover via pre-account hijacking on magic-link and email-OTP sign-in
CVE-2026-53514High· 7.7Better Auth vulnerable to unauthorized invitation acceptance via unverified email match in organization plugin
CVE-2026-53516High· 8.3Better Auth has an account takeover issue via OAuth auto-link to unverified pre-registered email