MAL-2026-17889Critical▾ Abyssal⚠ Exploited in the wildMalicious code in proxyrobika (PyPI)
▾ Abyssal zone — Critical with a public exploit or in-the-wild use
impact 52.3 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 18
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Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
The package exposes a single public function starts() that walks /storage/emulated/0/ (the Android primary user-storage root used by Pydroid/Termux-like Python environments), collects every .json, .py, .pyrubi, and .txt file into ZIP archives, and uploads each archive via requests.post to https://tapi.bale.ai/bot<TOKEN>/sendDocument with a hardcoded chat_id of 5263487757. The Bale Messenger bot token is hardcoded in source (with an environment-variable fallback referencing the same literal). The destination, bot token, and chat_id are all author-controlled and not caller-configurable; the README is empty and the code uses single-letter identifiers to obscure behavior. Calling the only documented API therefore ships the caller's local source files, configuration, and Rubika scripts to a mailbox controlled by the package author.
The package contains code for automated files exfiltration.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-10-proxyrubika
Reasons (based on the campaign):
files-exfiltration
target:android
proxyrobikaRefer to the advisory for the patched release.