RUSTSEC-2026-0285Medium· 5.3▾ SunlitTLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 29.2 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level
when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. For example,
a plaintext EncryptedExtensions message packed into the same record as the
ServerHello was accepted.
RFC 8446 section 5.1 requires that handshake messages do not span key changes, and that implementations terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert if they do.
The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext without rustls rejecting the connection.
This is functionally the same bug as Go's GO-2026-4340 (CVE-2025-61730).
rustls >= 0.23.13, < 0.23.45Upgrade to a patched release:
rustls 0.23.45Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvcMedium· 5.3Rustls: TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries
RUSTSEC-2026-0347Low· 2.3Buffered application data sent to outer server after ECH rejection
RUSTSEC-2026-0348Low· 3.7Brotli certificate decompression can allocate up to 1 GiB before authentication
RUSTSEC-2026-0349Low· 3.7Unauthenticated ServerHello can downgrade later connections to classical key exchange
RUSTSEC-2026-0346Medium· 4.0`Debug` impls for client session values expose TLS secrets
CVE-2024-32650High· 7.5`rustls::ConnectionCommon::complete_io` could fall into an infinite loop based on network input