SOCFortress CoPilot: Arbitrary Host File Write as Root via Path Traversal in the ScoutSuite GCP Report Upload (RCE)

Overview

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, POST /api/scoutsuite/generate-gcp-report in backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py admits admin and analyst users and validates the uploaded content as GCPScoutSuiteJSON, but passes raw file.filename from the multipart header to save_file_to_directory in backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py. The writer combines this filename with scoutsuite-report using os.path.join without sanitization or a resolved-path containment check. A traversal filename therefore writes the supplied JSON outside the intended report directory. In the reported root-running backend, the researcher demonstrated root-owned writes outside that directory and into the application source directory. This permits host-file overwrite subject to the accepted JSON-content constraint and can disrupt application operation; the demonstrated primitive does not establish unrestricted executable contents or unconditional cross-tenant confidentiality loss. Version 0.1.77 removes caller-controlled filenames from the affected route; unrestricted-content and direct-code-execution claims require separate curator reconciliation.

Affected

• CoPilot < 0.1.77

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.