CVE-2026-61739High· 7.5▾ MidnightPoC availableSOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, the Velociraptor Sigma exclusion-management endpoints in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` omit role …
▾ Midnight zone — Critical, or high with PoC / in-the-wild
impact 41.3 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 12
A public proof-of-concept already exists for this vulnerability — see Exploit availability below.
Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization from CISA's ADP record at CVE.org: whether exploitation is observed, whether an attack can be automated, and how much of the system is at stake. The CVSS score shown above comes from the assigning CNA record, not NVD.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via CVEORG
0.4%
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, the Velociraptor Sigma exclusion-management endpoints in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py omit role and tenant authorization, and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma/exclusion does not validate credentials. Its return_username_for_logging dependency in backend/app/auth/utils.py calls decode_token, which returns ordinary Invalid token or Expired signature strings on failure, and the dependency passes these strings through instead of rejecting the request. A Bearer header is required, but an arbitrary invalid, expired or forged value can create a suppression rule without a valid account. The collection GET at /create/velo-sigma/exclusion lists exclusions; the read, update and delete routes under /create/velo-sigma/exclusion/{exclusion_id}, and the /velo-sigma/exclusion/{exclusion_id}/toggle route, use get_current_user without role checks, permitting any authenticated customer_user to manage every exclusion. In backend/app/incidents/services/velo_sigma.py, process_sigma_alert calls check_exclusions and drops matching enabled alerts before incident creation. A null customer_code applies a rule across all tenants. Attackers can suppress detections platform-wide through channel, title or field matching, while low-privilege accounts can enumerate detection-tuning data and modify, disable or delete legitimate exclusions. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.77.
CoPilot < 0.1.77Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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